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A More Effective International Law or
a New "World Law"?Some Aspects of the Development of International
Law in a Changing International System
JOST DELBROCK*

INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, the international system' has been
undergoing a thorough change. The rigid bipolar power structure which
stabilized the international system for over forty years, but at the same time
allowed for little flexibility in the conduct of international relations, has given
way to an open, and to some extent, unstable political setting. The sovereign
nation-state-called a "concept in decline" years ago -- has experienced a
vigorous renaissance. Forming a sovereign nation-state ranks highly with the
different nations once forming the Soviet Union, the individual nations of the
disintegrating Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. A tendency to reassert national
sovereignty can also be observed on the part of the peoples of some of those
states which for decades, and with the overwhelming consent of their
electorates, have sought integration in supranational organizations such as the
European Community (EC).'
These trends are paralleled, however, by the intensified drive of other states
and governments for even more cooperation and international institution
building with a view to establishing a more stable and peaceful international
order. Thus, for instance, we can observe in international relations new lines
of cooperation between states which formerly opposed each other or kept

* Professor of German Constitutional Law, International Law, and European Community Law,
Christian-Albrechts-Universitdt Kiel, Germany; Visiting Professor of International Law and European
Community Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Dr.iur.habil., Kiel, 1971; LL.M.,
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 1960.

All translations from German are the author's own unless otherwise indicated.
1."International system" as used here means the relationship of the nation-state to the international
community. For a detailed description of this concept, see 1Il GEORO DAHM ET AL., VOLKERRECHT 11
(2d ed. 1989).
2. Id.
3. The changed attitudes of the electorates in Denmark, France, and Germany towards greater
integration of the European Community (EC) into a union with a common currency are indicative of
this trend of cherishing national sovereignty. See the report on the French referendum on the Maastricht
Treaty and public opinion polls in the other states named in Alan Riding, Reliefin Europe,N.Y. TIMFS,
Sept. 21, 1992, Al.
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themselves at a distance. Furthermore, these forces counteract the new
emphasis on national sovereignty by attributing increasing importance to
universal and regional international organizations, in particular to the United
Nations (UN). Strengthening international organization and institutionalized
cooperation is recognized as the key to reaching new stability within the
international system.4
In the context of the present Essay, it is of special interest to note that the
movement towards increased institutionalization of international cooperation
has also brought about a new consciousness of the importance of international
law as the legal framework of a comprehensive and stable international peace
order. Several recent important international events testify to the emergence
of a new appreciation of the role and function of international law by the
international community of states. For example, the then still-existing Soviet
Union and the other Warsaw Pact states renounced the doctrine of a separate
"Socialist International Law" existing along with general international law,
thus reestablishing beyond doubt the unity of the international legal order.5
Furthermore, at the Heads of State meeting of the UN Security Council on
January 30, 1992, world leaders impressively called for observing the rule of
law in the conduct of international relations and for strict adherence to the
law of the UN Charter.6 In their respective pronouncements, the Heads of
State took up a widespread sentiment among states and governments that the
rule of law and law enforcement ought to be given priority in international
relations, particularly in the field of international human rights protection.7
The same position had been previously supported by the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) member-states in two solemn
declarations in 1990, the Copenhagen Declaration and the Charter of Paris.!
A conspicuous aspect of these events is that all of them, implicitly or even
explicitly, signal a growing readiness of the international community to accept

4. The present movement by the governments of the twelve EC member-states towards forging
the EC into a union through the Maastricht Treaty and the efforts to institutionalize and strengthen the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are political strategies on point.
5. This new position was reaffirmed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the meeting of the
Heads of State and Governments of the Members of the Security Council at New York, January 30,
1992. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 45-48, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (1992) [hereinafter Heads

of State meeting].
6. Id. passim. This commitment to the rule of law and specifically to a strict observance of the UN
Charter law constitutes a significant shift in emphasis from the previous, predominantly political,
decisionist stance to a more normative approach.
7. See id. passim.

8. See the text of the Copenhagen Declaration, in Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, June 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305 [hereinafter
Copenhagen .Document], and the text of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30
I.L.M. at 190 [hereinafter Charter of Paris].
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far-reaching restraint on their sovereignty in favor of implementation and, if
necessary, enforcement of the principles and rules of international law. It is
quite in line with this new stance that we can also observe a growing
consensus as to the foundations and binding force of international law-a
prerequisite for a more effective international legal order as the basis of
international peace. 9
In view of these recent developments, ensuing to a large extent from the
end of the Cold War and the related decline of ideological divisions in the
world, the question is whether the changing perception of the role and
functions of international law marks a qualitative leap in the development of
international law. Are perceptions of international law changing from an
interstate law to a world or global law, or are we simply witnessing a process
which, at long last, makes existing international law effective, or rather, more
effective?
The complex developments taking place in the international legal order do
not allow for easy answers. This Essay attempts a differentiated assessment
based on three areas that are particularly indicative of the recent developments: the prohibition of the use of force, international protection of human
rights and the environment, and international law enforcement. After
examining each of these areas in turn, the final section of this Essay sketches
some perspectives on the future nature, role, and importance of international
law as the normative framework for the international and national conduct of
states as well as international organizations.

I. THE WIDENING SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE
USE OF FORCE AND OF THE CONCEPT OF THE
THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter comprehensively prohibits the use of
force,"0 thereby surpassing the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact's prohibition of
9. Theories that international law derives its binding force from the will or consent of
states-which are basically making international law subordinate to the will of the §tates and thereby
are actually denying the binding force of this law-are evidently losing ground. For instance, the
growing acceptance of the notion of erga omnes norms (norms relating to the protection of values
deemed indispensable by the international community and therefore binding on all states regardless of
their individual consent) in international law is incompatible with the traditional view basing the binding
force of international law on state will or consent. For a concise account of the normative foundations
of international law, see JOSEPH G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 18-23 (10th ed.
1989), and III DAHM ET AL., supra note 1, at 34-44.
10. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter reads, "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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going to war as a political means." The drafters, however, meant Article
2(4) to apply only to the international use, or threat of use, of force.'
According to the text and the drafters' intent, Article 2(4) does not cover
internal use of force, such as revolutions. In a corresponding construction, the
terms "breach of the peace," "aggression," and "threat to the peace," as used
in Article 39 of the UN Charter, 3 were interpreted to relate to the international use or threat of use of military force. In all but two cases, the Council
has adhered to the narrow reading of both Article 2(4) and Article 39.14 In
the post-Cold War era, however, a reinterpretation of the terms "use of force"
or "threat of use of force" as used in Article 2(4) and "threat to the peace" as
used in Article 39 may begin to answer the question of what impact changes
in international politics will have on the nature, future role, and functions of
international law.
In the wake of the recent Gulf War, the Security Council found itself faced
with the Iraqi government's severe persecution of Iraqi ethnic and religious
minorities, namely the Kurds and the Shiites. In view of the military force
used against these minorities, particularly the Kurds, which resulted at times
in genocide-like losses of life, the Council acted to safeguard the victimized
population groups from further oppression. In a resolution dated April 5,
1991, the Council condemned the repression of the Iraqi population, deeming
it a threat to international peace and the security of the region. 5
Even absent express references, it is clear from the wording of resolution
688 that it was based on UN Charter Chapter VII and Article 39 in particular.
The Council's determination that the consequences of the repression "threaten

11. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928,
T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
12. See Albredt Randelzhofer, Kommentar zu Art. 2(4) UN Charta [Commentary on Article 2(4)],
no. 29, in Die Chartader Vereinten Nationen-Kommentar68, 77 (Bruno Simma ed., 1991).
13. Article 39 reads, "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and
security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
14. The UN Security Council determined that the internal situations created by apartheid in South
Africa and racism in southern Rhodesia under the Ian Smith Regime constituted a "threat to the peace,"
although no internationaluse of military force was imminent. For details, see Jost Delbrifick, A Fresh
Look at HumanitarianIntervention under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 894
(1992) (with further references).
15. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991). In its
operative part, the resoulution reads:
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, in many parts of Iraq, including
most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international
peace and security in the region; ....2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the
threat to internationalpeace and security in the region, immediately end this repression....
Id. (emphasis on "condemns" and "demands" in original; remainder of emphasis added).
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international peace and security" 6 substantively corresponds to Article 39,
which empowers the Security Council to determine whether there exists "a
threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression." 7 Furthermore, in
the introductory sentence of the preamble of resolution 688, the Council
invoked its obligations and responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, which are set out in detail in Chapter VII of the
Charter. Thus, it is evident from the text of the resolution that the Council
found that an internal situation-the forcible repression of minorities in
Iraq-constituted a threat to internationalpeace and security because of its
"'consequences," that is, its potential escalation into an international conflict.
Less than half a year later, the Security Council confronted the growing
violence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where the constituent
republics of Slovenia and Croatia set out to secede from the Federation. When
the Security Council became seized of the crisis, the situation in Yugoslavia
was characterized by massive military exchanges between the federal people's
army and militia forces of the two seceding republics. Although there was no
immediate danger of neighboring states becoming involved militarily in the
conflict-Yugoslavian federal fighter aircraft intrusions into Austrian air space
notwithstanding-the Security Council did not hesitate in classifying the
situation as a "threat to international peace and security."'" On May 30,
1992, the Security Council, again acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
called for a comprehensive trade and air embargo against the Yugoslavian
republics of Serbia and Montenegro, which currently constitute the new
Federation of Yugoslavia, and for other nonmilitary sanctions. 9 The Security
Council recently authorized, in addition to sending a major peace-keeping
force with the consent of the' parties to the conflict, 0 military protection for

16. Id. at I.

17. U.N.

CHARTER

art. 39.

18. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 1, 3, U.N. Doe. S/RES/713 (1991). The
resolution reads in part:
The Security Council, ...
[d]eeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia ... (and
c]oncerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threatto internationalpeaceand
security .... [diecides, under ChapterVII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States
shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately
implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation
between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia ....
Id. (emphasis added).
19. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
20. S.C. Res. 721, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3018th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/721 (1991). For a brief
discussion of the legal implications of this resolution with regard to the role of the UN in internal
conflicts, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, ContinuingLimits on UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L. J.
909, 909-12 (1992).
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convoys transporting humanitarian aid to the civilian population in BosniaHerzegowina, 2" where heavy fighting erupted after that republic's declaration
of independence from the Yugoslavian Federation.
In January, 1992, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, decided in resolution 733 "that all States shall, for the purposes of
establishing peace and stability in Somalia immediately implement a general
and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment
to Somalia until the Security Council decides otherwise
*.22 Furthermore, the Council authorized the dispatch of peace-keeping forces to Somalia
to protect the distribution of humanitarian aid to the starving people of that
civil-war stricken country.23
The problem of the protection of minorities in Iraq called for international
attention again when reports of massive air raids on the Shiite minority in
southern Iraq were received in early fall 1992. The United States, the United
Kingdom, and France-after consultation with other governments, particularly
the Russian government-proclaimed a "no-fly zone" for Iraqi airplanes south
of the 32nd parallel. 24 American, British, and French fighter planes immediately instituted enforcement by flying surveillance missions over Iraqi
territory at the northern border of the "no-fly zone." No Security Council
authorization was sought. The governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France evidently deemed Security Council resolution 688
sufficient authority for the action taken; 25 a view which seems to be shared
by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who approved of establishing the "no-fly zone." Except for a warning by the People's Republic of China
against air attacks on Iraq by the surveillance forces, no other Security
Council member objected to the action. 26 Here again, although by inference

21. S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3093d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/64 (1992).
22. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992).
23. Id. This dispatch of peace-keeping forces presents a particularly interesting case because such
action requires the consent of the state concerned. Since there is no effective Somalian government, but
only various factions engaged in civil war, it was hard to establish which political groups engaged in
the conflict were to consent to the peace-keeping action. There may still be some doubt as to whether
all groups claiming a say in the internal affairs of Somalia have actually been consulted and have given
their consent.
24. Michael R. Gordon, British, French & US. Agree to Hit Iraqi Aircraft in the South, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 19, 1992, at Al.
25. Id. at Al, A6.
26. Id. In view of the long time that elapsed between adopting Security Council Resolution 688 and
the declaration of the "no-fly zone," there may very well be some doubt as to whether this resolution
could, indeed, serve as the legal basis for the enforcement of a "no-fly zone" or whether a new decision
by the Security Council should have been sought. But there is little convincing argument for assuming
that such new resolution would have had no legal basis in the UN Charter given the broader
construction of the term "threat to the peace" the Security Council had applied before. In fact, the
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rather than express decision taken, the violence within Iraq was the starting

point for an interventionist activity within the framework of a Security
Council decision.

In a number of other cases, which, however, did not involve a determination
of a "threat to international peace," the Security Council established peacekeeping forces with the consent of the governments concerned. But even so,
these cases are of interest in the present context: they all concerned internal
situations characterized by varying degrees of intensive force used by warring
factions resulting in widespread and massive human rights violations. Thus,
the Council established peace-keeping forces for Cambodia with a sweeping
mandate to supervise and assist the reestablishment of constitutional
government and the disarmament of the armies of the warring factions.27
Furthermore, the Council sent peace-keeping forces into El Salvador to ensure

observance of human rights by the government and the rebel forces.28
These and other instances indicate that the Council is prepared to construe
Article 39 more broadly than it was originally envisaged and applied. The

enforcement of the prohibition of the use of force, that is, of Article 2(4),
seems also to extend now to internal as well as internationaluse of force,
where this internal use of force at least potentially, or with some reasonable
probability, constitutes a threat to international peace and security and/or

results in massive human rights violations.29

II. ENHANCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

International protection of human rights has been a major concern of the
international community of states, whether at the level of the United Nations

President of the Security Council, British Prime Minister John Major, acting as the UK delegate,
emphasized at the meeting of the Heads of State the continued responsibility of the Gulf Coalition states
under Security Council Resolution 688 regarding the plight of the Kurdish and Shiite minorities in Iraq.
Heads of State meeting, supra note 5, at 136-37, 142.
27. For a summary of the complex mandate given to the United Nations in reestablishing
constitutional government and supervising the peaceful development in Cambodia, see statement of
October 23, 1991, by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar to the Paris Conference on Cambodia,
excerpted in UN Supervisory Powers, Cambodia, 26 U.N.L. REP. 9 (1991). The UN Transitional

Authority in Cambodia was formally established by Security Council Resolution 745 on February 28,
1992. S.C. Res. 745, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3057th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/745 (1992).
28. The UN peace-keeping force for El Salvador, which included a military component, was
established by Security Council Resolution 693 on May 30, 1991. S.C. Res. 693, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., 2988th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/693 (1991).
29. See also statements to that effect by members of the Security Council during the debate on
resolution 713 (1991) declaring the arms embargo on Yugoslavia, excerpted in Arms Embargo,
Imposition During Civil War, Yugoslavia, 26 U.N.L. REP. 6, 7 (1991).
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or at the regional level, and has been characterized by rather dramatic,
innovative steps in the enforcement of such rights even prior to the end of the
Cold War. Recent years have witnessed further enhancement of the international protection of human rights, which may have a major impact on the way
international law will develop. Much the same is true of international
protection of the environment.
The post-World War II era has seen the start of international protection of
human rights. The UN Charter obligates member states to promote universal
respect for human rights and not to discriminate on the basis of race, sex,
language, or religion in implementing human rights obligations. 30 Based on
this broad obligatfon, the international community has extensively codified
classical human rights for the protection of individual fundamental rights and
freedoms. In addition, the international community has codified economic,
social, and cultural rights directed at improving the economic, social, and
cultural conditions of the individual to make the enjoyment of fundamental
rights and freedoms more meaningful. More recently, the international
community has attempted to define and codify group rights and rights of
peoples, so-called "third-generation rights." 31 These "rights" or standards of
achievement are intended to enhance the political, economic, social, and
cultural self-determination and development of peoples to ensure the full and
equitable participation of all nations, rich or poor, in the international
community of states.
A significant and particularly innovative aspect of the large body of
conventional and, in part, customary human rights law is that it provides for
a variety of enforcement procedures. These procedures are available not only
to states, as the traditional actors in the international system, but also to
individuals whose rights, guaranteed by specific human rights provisions, have
been abridged.32
This generally positive picture of the innovative features of international
human rights law has been obscured and bleakened during the Cold War era
by the ideological polarization within the community of states. Time and

30. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3) and art. 55(c).
31. See Hans Petersmann, The Right to Development in the United Nations: An Opportunityfor
Strengthening Popular Participationin Development-Programs and Prospects, in DES MENScHEN
RECHT ZWiSCHEN FREIHEIT UND VERANTWORTUNG 125, 127 (Jirgen Jekewitz et al. eds., 1989).
32. See, for example, the complaint procedures under the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171-86, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 194, and Res. 1503, U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No.
IA,at 8, U.N. Doe. E/4832/Add.l (1970). For a well-documented analysis of procedures for dealing
with individual complaints (commnunications), see Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 746-72 (1973).
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again such polarization has led to bitter controversies over the true meaning
of the human rights codified in binding treaties and the scope of the
international authority to enforce human rights law. Except for politically and
culturally homogeneous regions such as Western Europe and, to a lesser
degree, the Americas, international human rights enforcement remained
considerably less effective than was hoped for at the time numerous
international human rights instruments were adopted. 3
Since the Cold War's end and the virtual disappearance of the oncepowerful notion of a distinct socialist human rights law, new avenues for
further elaboration of international human rights law have opened. This is
particularly true with regard to establishing a universal consensus on the basic
meaning of human rights and fostering acceptance of more effective
international human rights enforcement. Human dignity, as the anchor point
for the normative validity of international human rights law and as a basic
guiding principle for their interpretation and application, has become more
firmly established within the international community than ever before. Thus,
individual rights and fundamental freedoms are accepted, in principle, along
with economic, social, and cultural rights as integral elements of a meaningful
protection of human dignity, a concept which had been quite controversial.
Although many earlier international human rights instruments contained
references to this effect, recent reaffirmations of the value of human dignity
and of the rights ensuing therefrom34 are of particular importance in the
present context, since they have been pronounced under the auspices of the
disappearance of East-West ideological polarization.
The growing acceptance of fundamental human rights, accorded the status
of erga omnes norms because of their extraordinary importance for the
international community, illustrates the changing attitude of states and nations
towards the relevance of international law and the improving prospects for
more effective international human rights protection. Recognizing erga omnes
norms in the field of international human rights, 35 for example, the prohibi-

33. Though my earlier critical assessment of the achievements in international human rights
enforcement still holds in principle, progress has been made in the elaboration and realization of the
various complaint procedures on the universal level. See Jost Delbrfick, InternationalProtection of
Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 57 IND. L.J. 567 (1982) (discussing earlier criticism).
34. See, for instance, the declarations by the CSCE member states at Copenhagen and Paris, supra
note 8 and accompanying text, as well as the statements made by the Heads of States and Governments
at the Security Council summit meeting on January 30, 1992, supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
35. On the notion and enforcement of international erga omnes norms, see Jochen A. Frowein, Die
Verpflichtungen ergaomnes im V1kerrecht und ihreDurchsetzung,in VOLKERRECHT ALS RECHTsORDNUNG-INTERNA1ONALE GERICHTSBARKEr-MENSCHENRECHTE 241 (Festschrift Mosler), (Rudolf
Bernhardt et al. eds., 1983) (Beitr5ge zurn ausldndischen ffentlichen Recht und V6lkerrecht, vol. 81).
The International Court of Justice introduced the notion of erga omnes norms into international
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tion of torture and discrimination based on race, sex, political beliefs, and
religion, constitutes a major step towards the universalization of the meaning
of human rights. Great obstacles lie ahead regarding this universalization
process; for instance, cross-cultural and cross-religious disagreements still
exist on some of the fundamental values to be embodied in international
human rights norms. Recognition of some rights as rights with erga omnes
effect, however, provides an important basis to continue the necessary
international discourse on the scope and meaning of other human rights. At
the same time, such recognition increases the international community's
responsibility for human rights implementation.
The criteria for legitimate and lawful state conduct in the field of human
rights, vis-4-vis individuals and groups under their jurisdiction, are more
evident than ever before. Denying responsibility for the implementation and
enforcement of international human rights by reason of their alleged
indeterminacy or lack of international consensus as to their meaning has
become increasingly more difficult. Likewise, the obligation to use international authority for the sake of effective human rights enforcement, and to
participate therein, has become more pressing.
Due to the increasing involvement of nations in the protection of the rights
of national or ethnic minorities, the present development of international
human rights law has taken another decisive turn. Since the end of World War
II, there has been an almost total rejection of special protective regimes for
minorities. In view of the failure of such regimes established under the
auspices of the League of Nations, there was widespread consensus that the
former minority regimes should be replaced by a general system of human
rights protection for all citizens within given states regardless of their national
or ethnic origin. However, the reemergence of national and/or ethnic
minorities on the international stage, particularly in Europe after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, has now
prompted the international community to readdress this thorny issue.
There is a growing awareness that the individual's full personal development depends on the enjoyment of not only individual human rights, but also
of the individual's right to live within the ethnic or national community of his
or her origin.36 This presupposes the right of respective groups to preserve
their cultural heritage and to develop their ethnic or national identity. The
right to political, economic, and cultural self-determination, almost exclusively
applied in the context of decolonization during the post-war era, has thus

jurisprudence in the Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 5,

1970).
36. See, e.g., Copenhagen Document, supra note 8.
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reemerged as a universal principle as it was originally conceived at the end
of the nineteenth century and during the League of Nations era. 37 Apart from
the 1966 UN Human Rights Covenants,38 which codified and made binding
the right to self-determination, several important, albeit nonbinding,
international instruments on the rights of ethnic and national minorities have
been drafted in the very recent past. 39 Moreover, efforts have been made to

secure minority rights in bilateral treaties as between, for instance, Germany
and Poland,4" and in domestic constitutions.4
In the past, state sovereignty, protected by the principle of non-intervention42 into the internal affairs of states, has proven the staunchest impediment to effective international human rights enforcement. Although the
political organs of the United Nations, the Security Council and the General
Assembly, established a well-founded interpretation and practice with regard
to Article 2(7)-that violations of internationally recognized and protected
human rights are not matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
member states-states continued to invoke sovereignty and the non-intervention principle as a political tool to obstruct international human rights
protection, particularly when enforcement was at issue. Recently, however,
powerful groups of states have indicated an increased willingness to accept
even far-reaching restrictions on state sovereignty to make international
human rights protection more effective.43

37. For a discussion of the nature of the reemergence of the right to self-determination as a
universal principle, see Karl J. Partsch, Von der Souverdnitdt zur Solidaritdt: Wandelt sich das
Vdlkerrecht?, 18 EUROPAISCHE GRuNDRECHTE ZErrsCHRiFT 469, 474 (1991).
38. U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, and U.N.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
39. See Copenhagen Document, supra note 8; Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National
Minorities, July 19, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1692; CSCE Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human
Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law, and
Procedures for Fact-Finding of Oct. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1670.
40. See Articles 20-22 of the June 17, 1991 treaty between Germany and Poland on good
neighborly relations, reprinted in 46 EUROPA ARCHIV D 320-22 (1991).
41. The joint committee of the Federal Council (Bundesrat) and the Federal Parliament (Bundestag)
on revising the German Basic Law is presently working on a provision securing minority rights for the
Danish and Serbian national minorities in Germany.
42. This principle is part of customary international law, but it is also provided for in Article 2(7),
obligating UN organs not to interfere with matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
member states. However, Article 2(7) also provides for an important exception: when action under
Chapter VII is necessary, the principle does not apply. For a closer analysisof the scope and function
of Article 2(7), see Delbriick, supra note 14, at 891-96.
43. See, for example, the closing statement of the Security Council President at the Heads of State
meeting, supra note 5.
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Recent Security Council enforcement actions regarding the use of force
within certain states 44 have also involved a distinct human rights dimension
that obviously played a major role in treating the cases as matters of
international concern, thus setting aside the non-intervention principle
according to the exception clause of Article 2(7). The CSCE member states
and the EC considered themselves legally entitled to intervene, though not
militarily, in the Yugoslavian crisis and in other trouble spots in Eastern
Europe involving human rights violations. In the final documents adopted at
the January 30, 1992, New York meeting of the Heads of States of the
Security Council and the November 21, 1990, Paris meeting of the CSCE,
participants expressed a strong commitment to take a more restrictive
approach to state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.4 5
With the exception of the People's Republic of China and a few other states
following its example, a large majority of states thus seem willing to favor
human rights enforcement at the expense of the protection of their sovereignty
by the principle of non-intervention. Yet, there is reason to caution against an
overly optimistic assessment of the chances for future international human
rights enforcement since there are still major problems relating to the last area
to be dealt with here-determining the proper international authority to take
enforcement action, including its scope and intensity. Before turning to this
complex and vexing problem, however, a brief look at the innovative impulses
that international law, in general, has received from the development of
international environmental law is appropriate. Because here, too, international
enforcement of the law is clearly at issue.
In this Essay, no comprehensive and detailed description of the rich and
fast-developing body of international environmental law can be undertaken.46
For present purposes, it must suffice to list the major characteristics of
international environmental law that demonstrate the innovative trends in this
field of law. Traditionally, damage caused to the environment raised
international concern only if the damage done in one state originated from
another. In such a situation, the state from which the harmful impact on the
environment originated had to redress the damage caused, but only if it was
substantial. The legal basis for such liability ultimately rested on the
principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Several

44. See supra text accompanying notes 10-29.
45. See Charter of Paris, supra note 8; Heads of State meeting, supra note 5, at 143.
46. For an informative survey of the purposes and principles of international environmental law,
see Rildiger Wolfrum, Purposes and Principles of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 33 GERMAN
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [hereinafter GYIL] 308 (1990). For an in-depth analysis of the
problems of enforcing international environmental law, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the New
InternationalLaw of the Environment, 35 GYIL (forthcoming 1993).
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innovative refinements and expansions of the scope of the law governing state
liability for cross-border environmental damage notwithstanding, this
repressive rather than preventive type of law, although necessary, was
increasingly found inadequate for achieving direct and long-term protection
of the environment.
Thus, recent changes in the law have been aimed at prevention and
compensation. While compensation for environmental damage traditionally
was aimed at monetary satisfaction for material losses caused, the law as
applied by courts and tribunals, and as enunciated in a number of major treaty
provisions on liability for environmental damages, now provides for
compensation aimed at restoring the environment to its status prior to the
harmful impact. 47 As measures to prevent environmental damage, international practice created obligations to consult neighboring states prior to undertaking enterprises potentially harmful to the environment and obligations to
exhaust all technological means available to avoid the environmentally
harmful effects of given projects. Failure to do so ipso iure leads to
48
liability.
But international law did not content itself with these changes. Growing
awareness of the size and intensity of the dangers to the environment-besides
immediate deterioration of air, soil, and water by pollution, long-term climate
changes caused by global warming and depletion of the ozone layer-called
for fundamentally different approaches to the future format of international
environmental law. 49 The traditional paradigm of repressive and earlypreventive environmental law, based on individual state obligations and
liability, was found inadequate in view of the formidable global task of
preserving the environment and thereby securing a livable planet for the
future.
The new format of international law evolved from the legal regimes
governing areas beyond national jurisdiction, such as the high seas, Antarctica, and outer space, the latter two of which have become designated by law
as the common heritage of humankind. 0 Particularly, concern for the
protection of the sensitive ecosystem of Antarctica and of the marine
environment of the high seas has led to the development of a conceptual
framework for the necessary legal regulation of these environments, one

47. See Wolfrum, supra note 46, at 317 (providing further references, particularly to the
compensation to be paid for pollution of coast lines after tanker accidents).
48. Id. at 313.
49. Id. at 327-30 (providing a treatment of this aspect of the development of international
environmental law).
50. Id. at 321-23.
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which clearly transcends traditional international law notions of liability of
individual states and of the modes of international law enforcement.
The conceptual basis for the law on the environmental protection of
Antarctica and the high seas, which is related to areas beyond national
jurisdiction, can be located in the commonly shared responsibility of the
international community rather than in individual states' liability. What was
going to be protected under the emerging new law was the now-recognized
public interest of the international community, not individual state interests,
in the preservation of the environments concerned." It was but a logical
consequence of this new perspective that law enforcement was made a
responsibility of the international community as distinct from individual
states' responsibility and entitlement to law enforcement.
This innovative concept found its first expression in Article 218 of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.2 This Article entitles coastal or,
more precisely, harbor states to enforce the provisions against oil pollution
even if such pollution occurs outside their territorial waters, regardless of the
jurisdiction over a flag state's delinquent vessel or the damage suffered by the
harbor state itself. 3 Shared international responsibility for the preservation
of the environment and for the enforcement of relevant international
environmental law are the main innovative features now guiding the further
development of an international environmental law that meets global
environmental challenges such as global warming and ozone layer depletion.
In fact, the international community has proceeded with considerable pace
towards adopting relevant conventional law. For instance, the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was adopted in 1985"4 and
further developed by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer.5 In addition, as recently as June, 1992, states signed
conventions on climate change and biodiversity. 6

51. The notion of protecting public or community interests by norms of international law was
recognized by the International Court of Justice in terms of identifying international norms with erga
omnes effect. See Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 20 (Judgment of Feb. 5,
1970).
52. See DORIS KONIG, DURCHSETZUNG INTERNATIONALER BESTANDS-UND UMWELTSCHUTZVORSCHRIFTEN AUF HOHER SEE IM INTERESSE DER STAATENGEMEINSCHAFT 184-203 (1990); Wolfrum, supra
note 46, at 326.
53. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 218, 1, 12 I.L.M. 1261, 1319
(Dec. 10, 1982).
54. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (Nov.
1987).
55. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550
(Nov. 1987).
56. See generally O'Connell, supra note 46.
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A host of other conventions directed at preventing air and sea pollution
preceded these, in many ways, innovative conventions." Other conventions
addressed the pressing problem of the conservation of wildlife.58 While this
new body of law is directed at the preservation of the natural environment, the
underlying concept of international responsibility for the community or public
interests involved in the protection of the natural environment was also
applied with regard to the cultural environment as an integral part of the
human environment as a whole. The 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning
the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, for instance, by the
very wording of its title, hints at the concept of a commonly shared
responsibility of the international community.59 Nonbinding declaratory
statements of the purposes and principles of international protection of the
environment also abundantly demonstrate the new approach taken by the
international community of states to emphasize the international community's
commonly shared responsibility for effectively meeting global environmental
challenges. 6"
The alhost explosive process of developing international environmental law
directed towards meeting community interests and global challenges has not
been paralleled, however, by the development of adequate enforcement
mechanisms. 6 Vexing problems of legal policy have arisen: which international authorities should decide what constitutes a global environmental issue;
which protective measures would impose reasonable or unreasonable burdens
on the states party to the respective conventions; and, even more importantly,
which criteria of reasonableness should be used given the uneven distribution
of resources and economic capabilities between industrialized and developing
countries? This latter issue was raised in the context of efforts to protect the

57. See Wolfrum, supra note 46; O'Connell, supra note 46.
58.. See, e.g., Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat,
Feb. 17, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 12 I.L.M. 1085.
59. Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 27
U.S.T. 37, 11 I.L.M. 1358.
60. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, contains the first such statement of principle. U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416. It was followed by the Worl.d Charter for Nature, adopted
by the UN General Assembly on October 28, 1982, G.A. Res 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. 51,
at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51, reprinted in 60 U.N.Y.B. 1024, U.N. Sales No. E.85.I.1. For further
discussion of the conventions and nonbinding instruments mentioned in the text, see Wolfrum, supra
note 46, at 324-26.
61. Wolfrum, supra note 46, at 324.
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rainforests, which play an important role in maintaining world climate but are
also a major economic resource relied upon by developing countries.62
Besides these hitherto unresolved problems, the new environmental law
poses other questions relating to enforcement. The new conventional law on
the protection of the ozone layer and the world climate provides for
obligations to be implemented in the communal interest for which there are
no immediate corresponding rights or compensating benefits. The traditional
link between rights and duties and reciprocity as important incentives to
adherence to international law does not apply here.63 Implementation of the
new law now rests mainly on broad cooperation and a high regard of the
international community for the future improvement or-preservation of the
environment. More concrete enforcement means have yet to be devised and
the authorities to be vested with enforcement power have yet to be determined.64 Though the quality of enforcement adequate to meet the global
challenges in the field of environmental protection may differ from that in the
other major areas of international law dealt with here, the problem of
determining the proper international enforcement authorities and the scope of
international enforcement competence is raised in all areas of law here at
issue.
III. THE PROBLEM OF ALLOCATING LAW ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
It is almost banal to repeat that the international legal order lacks a general
central law enforcement authority. Enforcement of international norms and
obligations in day-to-day international transactions is decentralized, the
individual state being its own law enforcement agent. Acceptance and
legitimacy of international law, as well as reciprocity, are highly important
prerequisites and incentives for general adherence to international law. In
individual cases of breach of international law, retorsion, reprisal, and selfdefense are available to states to enforce their rights. 65 The right to recover

62. Id. at 329-30 (discussing the implication of the divergent interests of industrialized and
developing countries regarding measures protecting the world climate).
63. This Essay follows the interpretation of the relevant conventional law given by Wolfrum, id.
at 327.
64. For a full discussion on international environmental law enforcement, see O'Connell, supranote
46.
65. On international law enforcement, see I/1 DAHM ET AL., supranote 1, at 90-95. On international
human rights enforcement, see R.A. Mfillerson, Monitoring Compliance with InternationalHuman
Rights Standards, in CONTROL OVER COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (William E. Butler

ed., 1991). With regard to enforcement of international environmental law, see O'Connell, supra note
46.
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damages suffered due to violation of international law may be added. It is
important to note, however, that the present means of law enforcement
available to states is considerably more restricted than that provided for in the
classical period of international law.66
The comprehensive prohibition of the use, or threat of use, of force in
international relations has led to two essential restrictions on the system of
decentralized international law enforcement. First, reprisals, formerly
including the use of force, are now reduced to nonmilitary countermeasures.6" Second, the former right of the sovereign state to go to war for
purposes of law enforcement (liberum ius ad bellum) has been eliminated
from the body of international law altogether. 68 Even the right to selfdefense, guaranteed under UN Charter Article 51, has been modified in the
sense that it may only be exercised "until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.'"69
Modem international law, as it has evolved particularly after World War II,
has centralized international use of force to the extent that military enforcement measures may be applied only under the authority of the UN Security
Council or in cases of individual or collective self-defense within the bounds
of Article 51. This almost revolutionary change in the international legal
order, constituting a far-reaching restriction on state sovereignty, has remained
largely unnoticed by the international public because the political and
ideological rift between communist and noncommunist states rendered the
United Nations largely ineffective. To protect themselves from threats to their
territorial integrity and political independence, states have had recourse to
institutionalized forms of collective self-defense, such as NATO or the
Warsaw Pact, and to unilateral use of force to safeguard their rights, at best,
or what they considered to be their vital interests, at worst.
With the Cold War's end, chances to restore the UN's enforcement
machinery, in particular the Security Council, to its originally envisaged role,
and even to extend it, have greatly improved. Thus, the Security Council, as
the central authority vested with the power to act in cases of violations of
international law threatening or actually disrupting peace and international
security, has again become the focus of international interest.7" The Security

66. The period up to the end of World War I is referred to as the "classical period" of international
law. See Wilhelm G. Grew, History of the Law of Nations: World War I to World War I, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1984) [hereinafter
ENCYCLOPEDIA].

67. See Karl J.Partsch, Reprisal,in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 66, at 330.
68. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
70. See O'Connell, supra note 20; Delbriick, supra note 14, at 887-89 nn.4 & 6.
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Council's power under UN Charter Chapter VI to initiate the pacific
settlement of disputes, including the right to institute investigations with
binding force, 7 to undertake measures of conflict prevention, and to make
binding decisions on enforcement measures including the use of force,72
appears adequate, in principle, for discharging the task of maintaining or
restoring international peace and security. This assessment would seem to be
particularly convincing if the Security Council continues to interpret the
principle of non-intervention restrictively and to construe the term "threat to
73
peace and international security" broadly as it has done in the recent past.
For, only by such construction of the UN Charter would the Security Council
be able to exercise its jurisdiction regarding the new types of conflict
scenarios which increasingly tend to originate from clearly internal situations
in given states. Thus, the UN Charter seems to have resolved satisfactorily the
problem of allocating international enforcement authority.
However, the allocation of international enforcement authority exclusively
to the Security Council is not without problems. First, if the Security Council
continues to exercise enforcement authority, it will most likely encounter
political obstacles. The political consensus among the five permanent
74
members of the Council obtained during the "hot phase" of the Gulf crisis
cannot be taken as a guarantee that the paralyzing use of the veto power is a
matter of the past. The warning by the People's Republic of China that no
attacks be made on Iraq by the air forces of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France in the course of enforcing the "no-fly zone," established
for the protection of the Shiite minority, highlights the continued fragility of
the consensus among the permanent Security Council members. Furthermore,
the People's Republic of China has also made it clear that it is not prepared
to accept a general restrictive interpretation of the non-intervention principle.75 It is an unrealistic and inadequate simplification, therefore, to assume
that allocating international enforcement authority exclusively to the Security
Council is a cure for all.

71. U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
72. U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-53.
73. See Delbriick, supra note 14; see generally supra part I.
74. Beginning with Security Council Resolution 660 on August 2, 1990, the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council either unanimously endorsed the resolutions on enforcement
measures against Iraq or four permanent members voted in favor with the People's Republic of China
abstaining, which meant that China did not oppose (veto) the resolutions-an unprecedented consensus
among the permanent members in the Council's history of enforcement measures. S.C. Res. 660, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Year, U.N. Doc. S/Res/660 (1990), reprintedin THE KUWAIT CRISIs: BASIC DOCUMENTS

88 (E. Lauterpacht et al. eds, 1991).
75. See Heads of State meeting, supra note 5.
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Given the increasing need for international law enforcement in cases where
international peace and security are at stake, one must recognize that the
problem of allocating law enforcement authority in the present international
system is, indeed, more complex than formerly. The political and geographic
diversity of the causes of international conflicts may require reactions other
than those by the central authority of the Security Council. Provision must be
made for effective international law enforcement in the event of Security
Council inaction due to the exercise of the veto power. Under the present
conditions of the international system, therefore, there is still a need for some
decentralized international law enforcement-short of unilateral military
enforcement measures-for cases of threats to international peace and
security.
Indeed, the UN Charter has recognized this need, at least to a certain extent.
Article 53 provides for the competence of regional arrangements to deal with
matters involving international peace and security, including enforcement
measures. However, the competence to take enforcement measures depends
on an ad hoc authorization by the Security Council. Although it may be
politically easier to obtain such authorization, because states outside the
region would not get involved, the risk that the authorization may not be
given because of the veto power is still present. Thus, the allocation of merely
conditional enforcement authority to regional arrangements does not
effectively solve the problem inherent in the Charter system.
The present system could be improved if the competence to authorize
enforcement action by regional arrangement could also be exercised by the
General Assembly. It is established law that the General Assembly has a
subsidiary responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace
and security.76 The notion of the General Assembly's subsidiary responsibility could be applied to Article 53 with the result that the General Assembly
could authorize enforcement action by regional arrangements. However, this
approach would only reduce the number of cases where regional arrangements
would be prohibited from enforcement actions due to Security Council
inaction. Thus, if the General Assembly falls short of the required two-thirds
majority, the crucial cases, where the use of military force is necessary in a

76. See the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which recognizes the power of the General Assembly to
recommend enforcement measures (including the use of force in cases of aggression and breaches of the
peace) in case of Security Council inaction due to abuse of the veto power. G.A. Res. 377, U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., U.N. Doc. GA/RES/377N (1950). For a concise account of the drafting history of Resolution
377/V, see 1950 U.N.Y.B. 181-95, U.N. Sales No. 1951.1.24. For more details on the constitutional
implications of Resolution 377N, see Jost Delbriick, Die Entwicklung des Verhdltnisses von
Sicherheitsrat und Vollversammlung der Vereinten Nationen (1964) (doctoral dissertation, University
of Kiel, Germany).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:705

regional conflict, would still remain unattended by the Charter enforcement
system.
As of now, there seem to be no options available to completely close the
lacunae in the international law enforcement system in cases of the UN's
inaction. Under present Charter law, the use of force other than in self-defens
or by authorization of the Security Council and possibly the General
Assembly is unlawful. The responsibility of states for the enforcement of
international erga omnes norms and the responsibility of the community of
states for the enforcement of international law protecting public international
community interests do not provide a legal basis for military enforcement
measures outside the UN Charter's system. This is true even in cases
implicating massive and gross violation of human rights (such as genocide or
genocide-like acts) or grave crimes against the environment (such as the
burning of oil wells or massive oil pollution of water resources). The problem
of allocation of international law enforcement authority with regard to threats
or breaches of the peace is not yet resolved.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion of three important areas of international law
relating to vital interests of the international community of states shows the
remarkable changes which have occurred in the international legal order and
the trends towards even more significant changes. A growing consensus on the
foundations of the binding force of international law, the broadening of
international responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the international protection of human rights and the environment, as
well as the restriction of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention indicate the changes the international legal order is undergoing. Do these
changes amount to a fundamental change of the nature of international law,
that is, a transformation of international law as an interstate order into a new
World Law?
The answer would have to be positive if, as a rule, the changes indicated
mean that state sovereignty has been reduced to a level where states would be
subject to a comprehensive international legal order and enforcement
authority, and sovereign discretion of action would constitute the exception
in all cases where vital communal interests are at stake.
Some developments, such as the broadening of the Security Council's
enforcement authority, the growing acceptance of erga omnes norms, and the
recognition of a communal responsibility for the implementation of principles
protecting essential common values, certainly point in the direction of
international law moving away from the hitherto dominant paradigm of
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sovereignty. The changes also indicate that international law in an unprecedented way is concerning itself with matters formerly falling exclusively into
the realm of domestic jurisdiction, thus taking on the character of a comprehensive legal order similar to the comprehensive domestic or internal legal
orders.
In some respects, international law is changing into the "internal law" of a
World Community. However, the still-defective system of international law
enforcement and the still-persisting role of the paradigm of sovereignty
suggest that it would be premature to speak of such a far-reaching change in
the nature of international law.
What we are witnessing is, to a large extent, the rather rapid implementation
of the post-World War II promises for a world order governed by a more
effective international law. But it has also become clear from the preceding
analysis that considerable areas of international law still need vigorous
development, particularly the legal means of effective law enforcement in a
still conflict-ridden world. It is here where international lawyers face their
greatest challenges in the years ahead and where creative research and farsighted international legal education is needed.

